Computer Security: Anatomy of a Usability Disaster, and a Plan for Recovery by Sasse, MA
Computer Security:  
Anatomy of a Usability Disaster, and a Plan for Recovery  
 
M. Angela Sasse 
Department of Computer Science 
University College London 
London, WC1E 6BT, UK 
+44 20 7679 7212 
a.sasse@cs.ucl.ac.uk  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews past and current work on usability of 
security mechanisms.  Given that most users interact with 
computer security on a daily basis, it is astonishing how 
little interest the CHI community has taken in the design of 
security systems.  Many usability problems associated with 
security mechanisms could be avoided through application 
of basic usability knowledge and methods.  At the same 
time, the design of security systems raises some issues that 
cannot be met with existing CHI knowledge and methods.  
In conclusion, I will outline the research challenges for 
improving usability of security systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
My research interest in usability of security mechanism started in 
1996, when an international telecoms company asked us to 
investigate why their employees “could not remember their 
passwords”.  The company’s concern was prompted by the 
escalating cost of the helpdesk operation through which 
passwords were being re-set.  Anne Adams conducted an 
interview and questionnaire study with people inside and outside 
the company; when we published the results in Adams & Sasse 
(1999), the conclusion was that users  
• could not cope with the proliferation of passwords, 
• received little instruction,  training or support; and  
• were not motivated to behave in a secure manner. 
We placed the blame for this state of affairs on the computer 
security community, stating - acerbicly and somewhat 
uncharitably – that computer security was the last area of IT 
where user-centered design and user training were foreign 
concepts.  In fact, security researchers Zurko & Simon (1996) had 
recognized the necessity to apply user-centered design principles 
to security several years earlier.  Today, the security community 
in general has accepted the importance of what they commonly 
refer to as the “human factor in security” since one of their most 
influential exponents, Bruce Schneier (2000) wrote that 
“Security is only as good as it’s weakest link, and 
people are the weakest link in the chain.” 
Reformed social engineer Kevin Mitnick (2002) has provided a 
plethora of examples of how easily the majority of – under-
educated and untrained users – can be duped into behavior that 
compromises their own (or their organization’s) security.  Our 
own work was motivated by the realization that unusable security 
systems were not only expensive, but ineffective (Sasse et al., 
2002).  The increasing complexity of systems and applications, 
and the spread of networked systems and e-commerce has 
increased the possibilities for attacks.  This means the need for 
good security behaviour from home and corporate users is higher 
than ever; the reality in most organizations is that security 
behavior and culture is in a dismal state (Sasse et al. 2001). 
In the face of these developments, the security community is 
nothing if not receptive to guidance from CHI experts on how to 
improve usability and effectiveness of security systems.  This 
raises the question– what can we offer them?   
Based on the published evidence, the answer would have to be -
“not a lot”.  Even though most users interact with security 
mechanisms on a daily basis, the CHI community can muster less 
than a dozen publications on the topic; half of those come from 
my own research team.  As a result of this curious lack of interest, 
a key aspect of everyday technology has been allowed to evolve 
into a usability disaster.  What can we do to recover from this 
situation?  In this paper, I argue for a two-pronged approach.  
Firstly, we need to provide examples and hard evidence that 
application of basic CHI knowledge can improve not only 
usability, but also effectiveness and efficiency of security 
mechanisms.  Secondly, we need to recognize that the design of 
security systems raises some issues for which, to date, CHI does 
not have answers ready.  Further research is needed in a number 
of areas, such as the development of policies that govern the use 
of a particiular technology, and on the longer-term impact of 
technology on users’ habits, motivation and self-image, as well as 
collective behavior and organizational culture. 
 
 
 
APPLYING BASIC HCI PRINCIPLES TO SECURITY 
In an earlier paper (Sasse et al., 2001), I made a first attempt to 
demonstrate how exisiting CHI knowledge and principles can lead 
to the design of effective and usable security systems.  As with 
any technology implementation, characteristics of  
• the prospective users,  
• their goals, and the task through which they achieve 
them, and 
• the physical and social context in they perform the tasks 
set constraints to which the design solution must provide a good 
fit.  The combination and interaction of several characteristics 
often leads to conflicting constraints; optimization based on well-
understood priorities helps to identify the solution that will work 
best in practice. 
Current security mechanisms fail to acknowledge even very 
obvious constraints and CHI design principles.  Minimizing users’ 
workload –physical, but especially mental - is such a principle.  
Consider the some key characteristics of human memory 
• Items stored in memory decay over time – this means 
that we cannot retrieve items we don’t use with 100% 
accuracy, or at all. 
• Non-meaningful items are harder to recall than 
meaningful ones (such as words or place names). 
• Unaided recall is hard (much hard than cued recall). 
• We cannot “forget on demand” items we no longer 
need. 
• When retrieval is attempted, similar items compete and 
thus interfere with each other. 
The most widely used mechanism in computer security - 
password authentication – requires 100% correct unaided recall of 
non-meaningful items.  With the proliferation of passwords, 
which often have to be changed, the task users face is simply 
beyond the capability of human memory (unless a password is 
used so frequently that automaticity kicks in).  Furthermore, users 
receive no feedback when an attempt fails – they cannot tell 
whether the failure is due to a typing error, and entering a 
different password.  Several applied psychologists have made 
attempts to devise ways of improving memorabilty of passwords 
(e.g. Spector & Ginzberg, 1994; Zviran & Haga., 1990), but their 
proposals have not caught on because they rely on meaningful 
items, which reduces cryptographic strength of passwords.  
Security practitioners are very reluctant to make changes to the 
established mechanism when the password problem begins to 
outstrip support resources.  They look for fixes outside the 
mechanism (“all right then, write the password down, and just 
keep it somewhere safe”, or automatic password reminder 
facilities), deliberately ignoring the fact that these fixes creates 
different, but nevertheless significant security risks.  Application 
of CHI principles, however, would lead to the recognition that 
users need more support for infrequently used passwords, and 
lead to mechanisms that provide cued recall, allow for some error, 
and/or provide feedback when error occurs.   
CHI acknowledges that users’ behavior is essentially goal-driven, 
and the importance of designs that support users’ tasks and 
workflow.  For most users, most of the time, security is a enabling 
task, and this has a profound consequences for users’ perception 
of, and behavior towards, security (see next section).  Application 
of basic task design principles determines that performance 
criteria for the security mechanism must be chosen in line with 
the production task, and the actions required for the security 
mechanisms should not interfere with those required for the 
production task.  In most security implementations, however, a 
general mechanism is chosen to secure the system, without any 
consideration of the users’ tasks and the organization’s workflow.  
The study by Whitten & Tygar (1999) showed how designing a 
user interface to a security tool (PGP) with no consideration of 
users’ tasks can render it completely ineffective.  Adams & Sasse 
(1999) found that security often conflicts with production tasks 
and productivity goals.  In such cases, users respond by 
circumventing security mechanisms, and perceive security as 
something that makes their life difficult.  Task and workflow 
analysis should form the basis of the design of security systems, 
and not just the interfaces.  A usable interface on a mechanism 
that requires the user to push anything his hands are engaged 
elsewhere is useless.  If users have to respond to enquiries from 
customers in great haste, a login mechanism with which provides 
cued recall through a 4-step procedure involving graphics that 
take a long time to download is not a viable option.  
All technology has to function in a specific physical and social 
environment.  Biometrics are sometimes mistakenly promoted as 
a general solution to the usability problem in security (e.g. 
Nielsen, 2000) because users are identified through a physical 
characteristic (such as fingerprint, iris, face, or voice) and do not 
have to remember any password, PIN, or token.  However, like all 
security mechanims, specific biometrics will only work in certain 
user-task-enviroment contexts, and not others.  Air pollution and 
hand grease can affect fingerprint sensors, cameras used in iris 
and face recognition systems require constant lighting and 
positioning.  Biometrics are not acceptable to some users 
altogether, and to others in some application contexts.   
Currently, security policies fail to acknowledge that users’ 
behavior is governed by social and cultural conventions.  If a user 
has forgotten a password, but needs to log in to complete an 
urgent task, he will ask a colleague.  Security policies stipulate 
that users should not share their passwords.  Refusing the request 
in such a situation, however, makes the colleague appear 
uncooperative, and means she does not trust her colleague.  
Kabay (1996) identified the need to employ knowledge from 
social psychology in the design and enforcement of security 
policies.  CHI has only recently started to consider that users’ 
beliefs, attitudes, motivation, and values provide important 
constraints for technology design; we currently have tried and 
tested knowledge and methods for addressing these.  
 
NEW RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
Security is, in several aspects, different from other technology 
design problems.  One key problem mentioned in the previous 
section is the role of security of an enabling task.  Security is not 
a goal most users strive for; rather, it is seen to get in the way of 
their production tasks.  Current CHI knowledge can be applied to 
avoid making this state of affairs worse: when selecting a security 
mechanism, we can minimize users’ physical and mental load, 
ensure the mechanism fits with tasks, and takes account of the 
physical and social context.  To achieve this kind of “fit”, security 
practitioners will have to re-think their current approach of to 
securing systems through general, “maximum strength” 
mechanisms and policies. 
Security and CHI practitioners will need to work together to 
understand how trade-offs between performance on production 
tasks and security should be made.  Usability for individual users 
needs to be balanced against the security requirements of an 
organization, which in turn need to be based on a proper risk 
analysis.  Performance in security is harder to evaluate than other 
areas, because recording of certain data (e.g. password typed in) 
would create additional vulnerability.  Brostoff & Sasse (2001) 
demonstrated that testing the performance of a security 
mechanism in isolation from the task and context in which it is to 
be used is a waste of time.  The challenge is to create test-beds 
and test environments in which performance of new security 
mechanisms, and the impact on the production task, can be 
evaluated in context. 
Whilst a well-designed security mechanism will not put off users, 
it will not entice them, either.  In many home and organizational 
contexts, users lack the motivation to expend the extra effort.  
Weirich & Sasse (2001) identified a set of beliefs and attitudes 
held by users who do not comply.  The reason fall into 2 main 
categories 
1) Users do not believe the threat to security is “real”, and 
therefore see no need to expend effort required.   
2) Users do not believe their behavior makes any 
significant difference – “a determined attacker will get 
in anyway”, and/or “nobody else follows the rules, why 
should I?” 
Both lines of argument lead to the cost/benefit equation – people 
will not expend effort if they do not perceive or expect a 
(potential) benefit for themselves.  If it comes to securing their 
homes, many users will make the effort if they believe themselves 
to be at risk.  In many work environments, however, the users’ 
and organization’s goals are not aligned.   
To date, many security practitioners have tried to address this 
problem by enforcing desired user behaviors through sanctions.  
This approach may work to some extent in the military sector 
(from which, not surprisingly, many security mechanisms and 
security staff hail).  Most organizations, however, cannot afford to 
take the same approach – (1) it is too expensive to enforce 
regulations on a regular basis, and (2) the creative, flexible 
knowledge workers modern organizations seek to attract would 
not put up with this kind of treatment. 
Adams & Sasse (1999) argued that user training and motivation 
would help users to “do the right thing”.  The data from Weirich 
& Sasse (2001), however, suggest that education and training 
measures will not work unless users believe that they, or people 
they are about, are at risk.  Furthermore, being seen as security-
conscious is not exactly desirable in most people’s perception: 
users who follow computer security rules are currently seen as 
“paranoid” and “anal”.  Forcing users to behave in a manner that 
conflicts with their self-image is likely make matters worse by 
pushing users from “can’t be bothered” non-compliance to acts of 
covert hostility, i.e. sabotage.  The image of security needs to be 
improved – towards something seen as desirable, part of 
professional image.  Changing user perception in this way will 
require a long and well-thought campaign using social marketing 
techniques, within organizations and in society in general.  
Posters in workplaces (“Have you locked your screen?”) and 
rewards for good security behavior are some examples. 
A key insight that has emerged from our research over the past 6 
years is that employing any measures - such as improving user 
interfaces to security mechanisms, or mounting education 
campaigns - will have little effect lasting effect if used in 
isolation. 
Security is a socio-technical system and needs to be designed as 
such.  CHI aims to match technology to human characteristics, 
but currently does not have a method that aims to design (rather 
than just specify) desirable user behavior in tandem with 
technology.  As a first step in this direction, Brostoff & Sasse 
(2001) have adapted Reason’s (1990) model of human error (a 
socio-technical model for improving safety behavior in 
organizational contexts) to security.  Reason’s model is a good 
starting point because safety and security share the “enabling 
task” problem.  Two key differences are that the benefits of safety 
are more obvious to most people, and that safety does not have 
adversaries who actively seek to attack. 
A key challenge for the future will be to design interactions with 
security that foster good security behavior, and break bad security 
habits that have formed over a long period of time.  
Accompanying education measures cannot be aimed at individual 
users, the organizational security culture needs to be changed at 
same time.  Unlike many other technologies, security requires 
managers to be seen to be “leading by example”, and enforce user 
behavior, and be seen to enforce it.  Risks and rationale for 
required behavior have to be transparent to motivate users to do 
the right thing. 
Another key challenge is to understand which mechanisms are 
acceptable to which users under which circumstances.  Outside 
military environments, acceptability of a security mechanism is 
necessary conditiona for its effectiveness.  Amongst emerging 
security mechanisms, this is in particular an issue for biometrics.  
Biometrics have the potential to reduce the physical and mental 
load on users in many situations (in a recent study, I found that 
convenience was a huge factor in acceptance) but the fact that a 
user is identified uniquely means it harbors risks in terms of 
privacy and identity theft.  Users make cost (risk) and benefit 
(convenience, or “greater good”) assessment – relevant factors 
influencing perception need to be explored prior to 
implementation 
FURTHER WORK 
To address the challenges involved in designing usable security, 
CHI needs to address a number of issues.  Clearly, we need to 
integrate knowledge socio-technical systems research, safety-
critical system design, and social psychology into mainsteam 
design approaches.  Furthermore, we need be aware aware that 
the policies governing the use of a technology  need our attention 
as much as the technology itself. 
A final observation is that the CHI research community may be 
too focussed on novel technologies, and not interested in 
monitoring effectiveness and efficiency of technologies once they 
have become widely used.  There seems to be an implicit 
assumption that technologies that are widely used are, by 
definition, usable.  Examples such as password security and email 
show how technologies that worked well enough when first 
introduced can evolve into usability disasters over time and with 
extended use.   Unlike with new technology that has obvious 
flaws, users will not notice problems that build up over time.   In 
this respect, usability is like security – only ongoing monitoring 
and adaption will keep the menace at bay.   
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